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PART II 
Public Law 
CHAPTER 10 
Constitutional Law 
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR. 
§lO.l. Constitutional issues: Policy of avoidance. When judges are 
called upon to exercise their undoubted power to inquire into the 
validity of acts of other departments of the Government, their instinc-
tive reaction is, or should be, one of self-restraint. If it is possible, 
cases should be decided without going into questions of constitution-
ality. If constitutional adjudication is unavoidable, every effort should 
be made to avoid the conclusion that a law is invalid.1 On five occa-
sions during the 1961 SURVEY year the Supreme Judicial Court felt 
called upon to apply this salutary principle. 
In Golden, Petitioner,2 the question sought to be raised was one of 
the validity of the statuteS providing that one acquitted of murder or 
manslaughter by reason of insanity shall be committed to an institution 
for life, but may be discharged therefrom by the Governor and Council. 
A person so committed applied to a Probate Court for discharge under 
the statute,. which provides that one who has been adjudicated men-
tally ill may apply for adjudication of his recovery and competence. 
The contention was made that, since the commitment was not one 
upon conviction for a crime, Section 101 would be unconstitutional 
because, unless a judicial remedy is available for discharge of a com-
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR., is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and a 
member of the Bars of Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, and the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 
§IO.l. 1 The classic statement of this phase of judicial policy is found in the 
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley 
Authority, 297 U.S. 288,346,56 Sup. Ct. 466, 482, 80 L. Ed. 688, 710 (1936). 
2341 Mass. 672,171 N.E.2d 473 (1961). 
8 G.L., c. 123, §101. 
• Id. §94A. 
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mitted person who is mentally competent, deprivation of his liberty 
would be at the uncontrolled discretion of the executive. 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the contention. Pointing out 
that Section 94A, under which the petition was brought, was inap-
plicable because it covers only an adjudication of mental illness as of 
the time of its making, whereas the adjudication of the petitioner's 
insanity was as of the time of the homicide, the Court refused to con-
clude that the petitioner was left without judicial machinery to adjudi-
cate his present mental competence and to order his discharge. Avoid-
ing the doubtful constitutional status of Section 101 if it were construed 
as giving the Governor and Council exclusive jurisdiction to discharge 
a person in the petitioner's position, the Court said that some judicial 
relief is available. It suggested, without deciding, that an application 
under G.L., c. 123, §91, might lie. Even if it will not, and if no other 
statutory judicial relief is found, the petitioner may avail himself of 
the writ of habeas corpus. 
A more subtle but equally inexplicit technique was used to erase a 
suggestion of constitutional infirmity in the horse and dog racing stat-
ute.5 Bay State Racing Assn. v. State Racing Commission6 was the out-
growth of competition between two race track operators for harness 
horse racing licenses. The statute7 provides that such licenses may be 
granted for no more than an aggregate of 90 days in any year. In 1959 
the Bay State Association was licensed for 67 days, and its competitor, 
Eastern Racing Association, was licensed for 23 days. In 1960, Bay 
State's license was cut down to 57 days, and for 1961 it received a license 
of similar duration, although in each of the two latter years it had re-
quested 67 days. For 1961 Eastern's license was enlarged to 33 days. 
The case arose in the form of a petition by Bay State under the Admin-
istrative Procedure ActS to review the commission's denial of ten extra 
days to Bay State, and also its grant of ten extra days to Eastern. 
The statute, after authorizing the commission to issue licenses,9 
recites, rather inartistically, that the commission shall have "full dis-
cretion" to refuse to grant a license to any applicant. lO This seemingly 
posed substantial questions as to reviewability of the commission's acts. 
Could they be reviewed for error of law11 or lack of support by sub-
stantial evidence12 if there is no tangible legal standard to which the 
commission must adhere? This question, which was in substance pre-
sented by the demurrer to the petition, carried one of deeper impli-
cation. If there is no legal standard for the guidance of the commis-
sion in performing its licensing function, is there not a possible 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the commission? 
I) Id., c. 128A. 
61961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 951, 175 N.E.2d 244. 
7 C.L., c. 128A, §3(j). 
SId., c. 30A, §14. 
9 Id., c. 128A, §3. 
10 Id. §11. 
11 Id., c. 30A, §14(8)(c). 
12 Id. §14(8)(e). 
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The Court was unwilling to read the statute as giving the commis-
sion "an arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion," 13 and it chose instead 
to read into it a requirement that the commission "apply general stand-
ards of public interest, convenience, and necessity, similar to those 
which have been sometimes implied in the regulation of public utili-
ties." 14 This is reminiscent of the technique offered by Mr. Justice 
Cardozo11i of looking at a regulatory statute as a whole and gathering 
from it a legislative purpose to create a general pattern within which 
the subordinate agency is to operate. Although this method of saving 
statutes from the tag of invalid delegation was advocated in a dissent-
ing opinion, the principle which it expressed seems now to have general 
acceptance.16 
A more doubtful instance of interpolating language into a statute 
to offset constitutional vulnerability was Demetropolos v. Common-
wealth.17 This was a suit to determine the validity of one of the 
obscene literature statutes.1S This provides, so far as pertinent to 
the case, that whoever sells a pamphlet, printed paper, or other thing 
which is obscene, indecent, or impure shall be punished. A companion 
statute19 provides that whoever sells a book, "knowing it to be obscene, 
indecent, or impure," shall be punished. The plaintiff had been 
charged, under the former statute, with sale of a magazine which, it 
was stipulated, was obscene, indecent, and impure within the meaning 
of the statute. There was, however, no showing that the accused had 
knowledge of the content of the magazine. The criminal case was 
continued, without findings, pending the outcome of the declaratory 
judgment proceeding. 
The Court ruled that Section 28A was not in violation of either the 
state or the federal Constitution. It noted that the Supreme Court 
of the United States had invalidated a Los Angeles city ordinance 
punishing the offering for sale of obscene or indecent books, where 
the ordinance had been construed as not requiring knowledge on the 
part of the accused of the contents of the book.2o Such an ordinance 
was held to be an abridgment of freedom of the press in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Judicial Court saved 
Section 28A from a similar defect by reading it "as if it contained the 
words 'knowing it to be obscene, indecent or impure: " 21 
131961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 951,956,175 N.E.2d 244,249. 
141961 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 955,175 N.E.2d at 248. 
15 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 298 U.S. 888, 488, 55 Sup. Ct. 241, 254, 79 L. Ed. 
446, 466 (1985) (dissenting opinion). 
16 See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 884 U.S. 742, 68 Sup. Ct. 1294, 92 L. Ed. 1694 
(1948); Fahey v. Mallonee, 882 U.S. 245, 67 Sup. Ct. 1552, 91 L. Ed. 2080 (1947). 
And see Butler v. East Bridgewater, 880 Mass. 88, llO N.E.2d 922 (1958), in which 
a similar result appears to have been reached, although there is no discussion of 
the statutory standard for exercise of the delegated power there involved. 
17 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 917,175 N.E.2d 259. 
IS G.L., c. 272, §28A. 
19 Id. §28B. 
20 Smith v. California, 861 U.S. 147, 80 Sup. Ct. 215, 4 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1960). 
211961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 917, 920,175 N.E.2d 259, 262. 
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While it is a "cardinal principle" 22 that a court should resort to 
interpretation in order to avoid coming to grips with serious doubts 
as to constitutionality, it is of possibly equal importance that courts 
observe the distinction between interpretation and amendment. This 
distinction is, of course, easier to state than to define. It may be one 
thing to give a restrictive, even violently restrictive, meaning to a word 
that is actually in a statute23 in order to dissipate doubts that would 
arise if a more expansive meaning were given to the word, and some-
thing else again to read into a statute words which the legislature did 
not put there in order to avoid similar doubts. Whether the distinc-
tion is more than a verbal one, at least in many instances, is debat-
able.24 "Reading in" additional language, as in the Demetropolos 
case, may fall into the category of interpretation on the score that the 
legislature clearly would have written the language into the statute 
had it adverted to the constitutional necessity of such language. 
There is, on the other hand, danger that courts which adopt the 
"reading in" technique may end with substituting for legislative 
language words that the judges would have written into the statute if 
they had been the legislators. The authorities on the point are not at 
all in harmony, and the reasons for the conflicting decisions are not too 
carefully spelled out.25 
Other instances of judicial restraint in meeting constitutional issues 
were Board of Health of Franklin v. Hass,26 where the Court held that 
the party seeking to raise the question of validity of a statute lacked 
standing to do so because of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, 
and Donahue v. Selectmen of Saugus,27 where the Court held that the 
question Was prematurely raised, since the section of the statute 
involved in the litigation was separable from the section the validity of 
which was sought to be drawn into question. 
§lO.2. Self-incrimination: Test. The difficulty and perhaps the 
futility of devising verbal formulas to define constitutional doctrines 
was illustrated,in Sandrelli v. Commonwealth.1 There the Supreme 
Judicial Court purported to set up a criterion for application of the 
constitutional provision that "No subject shall be . .. Compelled to 
accuse, or furnish evidence against himself." 2 
Sandrelli was called as a witness before a grand jury that was 
investigating the killing of one Joseph DeMarco, whose bullet-ridden 
body had been found in a dump. Sandrelli was asked a series of 
22 Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 
288,348, 56 Sup. Ct. 466, 483, 80 L. Ed. 688, 712 (1936). 
23 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 73 Sup. Ct. 543, 97 L. Ed. 770 (1953). 
24 See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, in United States v. Rumely, 
345 U.S. at 48, 73 Sup. Ct. at 547, 97 L. Ed. at 776. 
25 Cases pro and con are collected in Sutherland, Statutory Construction §4924 
(Horack ed. 1943). 
26342 Mass. 421, 173 N.E.2d 808 (1961). 
271961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1137, 176 N.E.2d 34. 
§IO.2. 1342 Mass. 129, 172 N.E.2d 449 (1961). 
2 Mass. Const., Declaration of Rights, Art. XII. 
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questions,S most of which he refused to answer, although admonished 
by the court to do so, under claim of privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. He was thereupon ordered to show cause why he should not be 
adjudged in contempt. 
At the contempt hearing Sandrelli attempted to prove, through 
testimony of the district attorney and his assistant, and by a tape 
recording of a radio broadcast by the former, that the officials had 
made public statements in which they proposed to prove that Sandrelli 
was in the company of the deceased the night before, or the early 
morning of the day on which the body was discovered, and also that 
Sandrelli was the owner, in fact, though not of record, of the restaurant 
in question. He also offered newspaper reports of similar tenor, 
records of the local licensing board with respect to ownership of the 
restaurant, and his own probation record. All the evidence was 
excluded, and Sandrelli was found guilty of contempt and sentenced 
to imprisonment. The decision noted was on writ of error to review 
the conviction. 
At the contempt trial, Sandrelli asked for a ruling that "the court 
cannot adjudge the accused in contempt unless it is perfectly clear 
from a careful consideration of the questions propounded, in the light 
of the circumstances disclosed, that they could have been answered 
with entire impunity." 4 This request was denied, and the court ruled 
instead that "the court must see from the circumstances of the case and 
the nature of the evidence which the witness is called to give that there 
is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his 
being compelled to answer," and that "there must be real or substantial 
danger that the answers ... would lead to a charge of crime or to the 
securing of evidence to support a charge of crime." 
The Supreme Judicial Court, at the outset of its opinion, undertook 
to pass upon the correctness of the ruling that, it will be observed, was 
made practically in vacuo,5 since the trial judge had excluded all the 
proffered evidence of the circumstances, against the background of 
S These were: "a. Will you tell us, sir, if you are acquainted with the young lady, 
approximately twenty years old, who goes under the name of Mickey Taylor? 
b. Now sir, are you acquainted with a young lady, approximately eighteen years 
old, who goes under the name of Carolyn Diabo? c. Tony, were you born on 
August 26, 1908? d. Did you know a man by the name of Peter Jordan? e. Will 
you tell us what time it was on the 11 th or 12th that Joseph Angie DeMarco ar-
rived at your restaurant, the Coliseum, at 144 Hanover Street? f. Now in regard 
to the early A.M. hours of November 12, 1959, do you know what time Joseph Angie 
DeMarco left the Coliseum? g. Now sir, directing your attention to November 11, 
that is the holiday, and November 12, 1959, will you tell us whether or not you were 
in the city of Boston, Mass.? h. Now, sir, will you tell us whether or not you are 
in the city of Cambridge, Mass., today?" The witness answered the questions "c" 
and "h." 
4 This language was taken bodily from the opinion in Arndstein v. McCarthy, 
254 U.S. 71,72,41 Sup. Ct. 26, 26, 65 L. Ed. 138, 142 (1920). 
5 The trial judge, although he refused to admit in evidence the probation record 
of the witness, nonetheless announced that he was "taking notice" of it, and would 
have its contents in mind as facts he would "consider in determining the issue." 
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which the allegedly incriminatory questions had been put. In the 
second part of its opinion, the Court ruled that the exclusion of 
the evidence was error, presumably because it deprived the accused 
of an opportunity to have a judicial determination whether compelling 
answers to questions which were harmless on their face would in fact 
violate the constitutional prohibition of compulsory self-incrimination. 
Although the Court reversed the judgment of conviction for con-
tempt on account of the improper exclusion of the defendant's 
evidence, it sustained the trial judge's rulings as to the test of questions, 
the answers to which would be incriminatory within the meaning of 
the constitutional prohibition. The issue, as the Court saw it, was 
whether the Constitution means that the claim of privilege must 
be allowed unless it is perfectly clear that answers to the questions 
will not tend to incriminate, or that the claim of privilege must be 
disallowed unless there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger 
to the witness if he is compelled to answer. 
In concluding that the latter rather than the former proposition 
correctly stated the law, the Court said that it was following, as it had 
in an earlier case,6 the decision of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Mason v. United States} in which a comparable provision 
of the federal ConstitutionS was construed. The Court went on to 
say that it rejected the doctrine of more recent decisions of the Supreme 
Court9 because those decisions, while they did not overrule Mason, 
undoubtedly "substantially modified" 10 it. The Court preferred what 
it regarded as the classic doctrine expressed by the Queen's Bench in 
Regina v. Boyes,11 approved by the Supreme Court of the United States 
in Mason: "To entitle a party called as a witness to the privilege of 
silence, the Court must see, from the circumstances of the case and the 
nature of the evidence which the witness is called to give, that there is 
reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being 
compelled to answer . . ." 
The nuances among these various statements of doctrine are so 
subtle as to make them seem to border on exercises in semantics. At 
best, the treatment of such statements as definitive rules tends to make 
courts forget that the declaration of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, like the other great ordinances of bills of rights, is the expression 
of a basic ideal, and that the judicial function is to determine the 
applicability of the ideal in various factual situations. Likely to be 
overlooked is the teaching of Mr. Justice Miller, when he said, over 
6 Commonwealth v. Joyce, 326 Mass. 751, 97 N .E.2d 192 (1951). 
7244 U.S. 362, 37 Sup. Ct. 621, 61 L. Ed. 1198 (1917). 
S u.S. Const., Amend. V: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself .... " 
9 Singleton v. United States, 343 U.S. 944, 72 Sup. Ct. 1039, 96 L. Ed. 1349 (1952); 
Greenberg v. United States, 343 U.S. 918, 72 Sup. Ct. 645, 96 L. Ed. 1332 (1952); Hoff-
man v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 7I Sup. Ct. 814, 95 L. Ed. 1118 (1951). 
10342 Mass. 129, 134, 172 N.E.2d 449, 452 (1961). 
11 1 B. Be S. 3ll, 329, 330, 121 Eng. Rep. 730, 737, 738 (Q.B. 1861). 
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eighty years ago, of the technique of expounding the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: 
But, apart from the imminent risk of a failure to give any defini-
tion which would be at once perspicuous, comprehensive, and 
satisfactory, there is wisdom, we think, in the ascertaining of the 
intent and application of such an important phrase in the federal 
Constitution by the gradual process of judicial inclusion and 
exclusion, as the cases presented for decision shall require, with 
the reasoning on which such decisions may be founded. This 
court is, after an experience of nearly a century, still engaged in 
defining the obligation of contracts, the regulation of commerce, 
and other powers conferred on the federal government, or limita-
tions imposed upon the states.12 
Despite the broad generalizations found in some of the reported 
opinions, examination of the decisions themselves reveals that what a 
court traditionally does is to inquire whether, on the facts of the partic-
ular case, the claim of privilege comes within the policy set forth in the 
instrument that created the privilege. 
Thus, in Regina v. Boyes,13 a witness was questioned about an 
election bribe to which he had been privy. He claimed privilege 
(as he was undoubtedly entitled to do), whereupon the Crown counsel 
gave him a pardon under Great Seal. He persisted in his claim of 
privilege, arguing that, while the pardon would protect him from 
prosecution in the courts by the Crown, it would not protect him from 
impeachment by the House of Commons in Parliament. Chief Justice 
Cockburn rejected the claim, saying that the fear of the asserted 
eventuality was ridiculous, since the Commons had never undertaken 
to punish directly in such cases.14 
12 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104,24 L. Ed. 616, 619 (1878). 
131 B. & S. 311, 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (Q.B. 1861). It is of some interest that this, 
like the Sandrelli case, was a proceeding in the nature of an advisory opinion. It 
was not a prosecution of the witness for unwarranted assertion of privilege, but 
it was an anomalous projection of the case against the original defendant pursuant 
to a stipulation that if the testimony of the witness (he apparently did not press 
his claim of privilege) was in fact incriminatory, it would not be held against the 
defendant. Chief Justice Cockburn protested against this procedure, and ordered 
that it should not be followed in any other case. 1 B. & S. at 328, 121 Eng. Rep. at 
737. 
14 In a portion of the opinion not quoted in the Sandrelli case, the following 
passage occurs: "We indeed quite agree that, if the fact of the witness being in 
danger be once made to appear, great latitude should be allowed to him in judging 
for himself of the effect of any particular question: there being no doubt, as ob-
served by Alderson, B., in Osborn v. The London Dock Company (10 Exch. 698, 
701), that a question which might appear at first sight a very innocent one, might, 
by affording a link in a chain of evidence, become the means of bringing home an 
offence to the party answering. Subject to this reservation, a Judge is, in our opin-
ion, bound to insist on a witness answering unless he is satisfied that the answer 
will tend to place the witness in peril." 1 B. & S. at 330, 121 Eng. Rep. at 738. 
7
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Again, in Mason v. United States,111 a grand jury, investigating 
gambling, asked a witness whether cards were being played at the table 
at which he sat in an Alaska billiard hall. The Court held that no 
sufficient showing had been made of circumstances indicating that 
an answer would tend to involve the witness in danger. It pointed out 
that it is not unlawful to be a spectator at a card game, or even to join 
in a game if it is not being played for valuable stakes. This, of course, 
is an almost unbelievably naive appraisal of the situation since, as 
Judge Hastie more recently pointed out,16 "the normal connotation 
of a card game in a frontier saloon is not that of a game of Old Maid 
on a supervised public playground." The decision may have been 
wrong, but what is important for present purposes is that the technique 
of the Court was to inquire whether the record showed the existence of 
circumstances which would attach a sinister significance to questions 
which, on their face, were innocent. 
Certainly, the Court showed a higher degree of sophistication in 
Hoffman v. United States,17 in which a grand jury investigating 
racketeering asked a witness what his occupation was, and whether he 
had talked with one Weisberg during the week. It was shown that 
the witness had a public reputation of being a racketeer, and that 
Weisberg was being sought as a witness before the grand jury, but could 
not be located. The Court agreed that, in these circumstances, the 
claim of privilege was well taken. It took cognizance of the fact that 
the chief occupation of some persons involves violation of law, so 
that an answer by Hoffman to the question as to his occupation might 
well be directly incriminating. Furthermore, questions as to contacts 
with Weisberg, put to one with Hoffman's background, might well call 
for answers that would constitute links in a chain of proof of charges 
that Hoffman was unlawfully sheltering the fugitive witness. 
It is possible, of course, that a court can be oversophisticated in 
arriving at conclusions as to the significance of surrounding circum-
stances. One case, for example, arose out of an investigation by the 
House Committee on Un-American Activities into Communist infiltra-
tion into unions. A witness was questioned as to his acquaintance 
with a number of named individuals, and as to positions they had held 
in a union. When it was shown that the witness was general secretary 
of the union, that he had been suspected of Communism, and that 
the persons named in the questions had also been suspected of Com-
munism, the majority of the Court was of the opinion that these 
circumstances justified the witness in his refusal to answer, because 
his answers might have been used as links in a chain of proof of 
charges of filing false non-Communist affidavits.18 Mr. Justice Harlan 
dissented. He felt that the majority, in making this judgment of the 
significance of the surrounding circumstances, was "painting with 
111244 U.S. 362. 37 Sup. Ct. 621.61 L. Ed. 1198 (1917). 
16 United States v. Coffey. 198 F.2d 438. 440 (3d Cir. 1952). 
17341 U.S. 479. 71 Sup. Ct. 814, 95 L. Ed. 1118 (1951). 
18 Emspack V. United States, 349 U.S. 190. 75 Sup. Ct. 687. 99 L. Ed. 997 (1955). 
8
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too broad a brush." 19 His quarrel, however, was with the judgment 
which the majority made, not with the fact that they had made a 
judgment. 
If the Massachusetts Court, in the Sandrelli case, really differs with 
the Supreme Court of the United States on the doctrine of self-incrim-
ination, it is, of course, perfectly free to do so. Fourteenth Amendment 
due process does not require states to accept the federal standards 
of the privilege against self-incrimination.20 Indeed, on more than 
one occasion, the Court has refused to follow the Supreme Court of the 
United States in determining the scope of regulatory power left to 
the state by the due process concept.21 
§lO.3. Sunday laws: Constitutionality. The so-called Lord's Day 
Statute1 was sustained against attack on constitutional grounds by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.2 A divided federal district court 
of three judges had held the statute invalid,s both because Section 5, 
in prohibiting the doing of business on Sundays, constituted an 
establishment of religion, and because Section 6, in setting up "an 
almost unbelievable hodgepodge" 4 of exceptions to the prohibition, 
constituted a denial of equal protection of the laws. 
In the Supreme Court the case was one of four appeals in which the 
Court reviewed the Sunday laws of Maryland and Pennsylvania, as 
well as those of Massachusetts.5 The principal opinion was written 
in the case from Maryland, and the statutes of that state, as well as 
those of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, were upheld. 
As to the equal protection objection, the Court pointed to the "wide 
scope of discretion" 6 that a state is permitted in making legislative 
19349 U.S. at 212, 75 Sup. Ct. at 708, 99 L. Ed. at 1013. 
20 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947); 
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97 (1908); cf. Justices 
Black and Douglas, concurring specially in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174, 
177, 72 Sup. Ct. 205, 211, 212, 96 L. Ed. 183, 191, 193 (1952). 
21 Compare Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 36 Sup. Ct. 370, 60 
L. Ed. 679 (1916), with Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Director of the Division of 
Necessaries of Life, 307 Mass. 408, 30 N.E.2d 269 (1940); Daniel v. Family Security 
Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 69 Sup. Ct. 550, 93 L. Ed. 632 (1949), with Opinion of 
the Justices, 322 Mass. 755, 79 N.E.2d 883 (1948); Federal Power Commission v. 
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 64 Sup. Ct. 281, 88 L. Ed. 333 (1944), with 
Lowell Gas Co. v. Department of Public Utilities, 324 Mass. 80, 84 N.E.2d 811 (1949). 
§1O.3. 1 G.L., c. 136, generally, and §§5, 6, specifically. 
2 Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617, 81 Sup. 
Ct. 1I22, 6 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1961). 
S Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc. v. Gallagher, 176 F. Supp. 466, supple-
mental dissenting opinion, 178 F. Supp. 336 (D. Mass. 1959). 
4176 F. Supp. at 472. 
1) The other cases were McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 Sup. Ct. 1I01, 
6 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1961); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 81 Sup. Ct. Il35, 6 
L. Ed. 2d 551 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 81 Sup. Ct. 1144, 6 L. Ed. 2d 
563 (1961). 
6 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425, 81 Sup. Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L. Ed. 2d 
393, 399 (1961). 
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classifications, and also to the presumption of validity which, Chief 
Justice Warren said, "has not been dispelled." '1 
As to the objection that the statutes were forbidden "laws respecting 
an establishment of religion," the Court acknowledged that in their 
colonial origins the statutes in question had apparent "religious 
orientation." 8 It pointed out, however, that from about the middle 
of the eighteenth century.the purpose of the legislation "was no longer 
solely religious," 9 and that increasingly "secular justifications have 
been advanced for making Sunday a day of rest, a day when people 
may recover from the labors of the week just passed and may physically 
and mentally prepare for the week's work to come." 10 The conclusion 
was reached that the statutes "for the most part, ... have been 
divorced from the religious orientation of their predecessors," 11 and, 
"as presently written and administered, most of them, at least, are of a 
secular rather than of a religious character . . ." 12 
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan concurred separately, on the ground 
that, over the centuries since the first Sunday statute of Henry VI in 
1448,13 there has been an evolutionary institutionalization of Sunday, 
so that, "for many millions of people life has a hebdomadal rhythm in 
which this day, with all its particular associations, is the recurrent 
note of repose." 14 This fact, in the light of broadened concepts 
of the scope of state police power,lII is ample justification for the 
legislation. 
In the Maryland case16 and the Two Guys case,11 both of which 
involved ordinary commercial operations in violation of the statutes, 
Justices Brennan and Stewart joined in the opinion of the Court. 
They dissented, however, in the Braunfeld18 and Gallagher19 cases. 
They felt that application of Sunday closing laws to Orthodox Jews or 
others under a religious obligation of Sabbatarian observance con-
'1 Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc., lI66 U.S. 617, 624. 81 
Sup. Ct. 1122. 1126.6 L. Ed. 2d 5l16. 540 (1961). 
8 McGowan v. Maryland. 366 U.S. 420, 433, 81 Sup. Ct. 1101, 1109, 6 L. Ed. 2d 
lI9l1, 403 (1961). 
9 Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617. 626. 81 
Sup. Ct. 1122, 1127,6 L. Ed. 2d 536. 541 (1961). 
10 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 434, 81 Sup. Ct. 1101, 1110, 6 L. Ed. 2d 
lI93, 404 (1961). 
11 Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617, 626, 81 
Sup. Ct. 1122, 1127,6 L. Ed. 2d 536, 541 (1961). 
12 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444, 81 Sup. Ct. 1101, 1115. 6 L. Ed. 2d 
lI9l1, 410 (1961). 
13 27 Henry VI, c. 5 (1448), quoted at 366 U.S. 420. 470, 81 Sup. Ct. 1101, 1159, 
6 L. Ed. 2d 393. 425 (1961). 
14 McGowan v. Maryland. 366 U.S. 420, 503. 81 Sup. Ct. 1101, 1177, 6 L. Ed. 2d 
lI9l1, 443 (1961) (concurring opinion). 
111 366 US. at 497n, 81 Sup. Ct. at 1174n. 6 L. Ed. 2d at 4l19n. 
161166 U.S. 420.81 Sup. Ct. 1101.6 L. Ed. 2d lI93 (1961). 
17366 U.S. 582, 81 Sup. Ct. 1135.6 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1961). 
18366 U.S. 599, 81 Sup. Ct. 1144.6 L. Ed. 2d 563 (1961). 
19366 U.S. 617, 81 Sup. Ct. 1122,6 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1961). 
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stituted a prohibition of free exercise of religion. Mr. Justice Douglas 
dissented in all four cases, because he felt that any application of 
Sunday closing laws interfered with free exercise of religion. 
The decisions apparently establish the firmness of the foundation of 
Sunday closing laws,20 except perhaps such as may be found "to use 
the State's coercive power to aid religion." 21 There remain a number 
of prudential questions (which may have been pointed up by the 
litigation) as to the desirable scope of prohibition and of exemption 
therefrom. These questions have been complicated by recent legisla-
tion22 making the provisions of the Sunday closing laws applicable 
on certain legal holidays. The Governor of Massachusetts appointed a 
committee of citizens in various walks of life to investigate and 
recommend revisions of the Sunday laws. The committee has held 
hearings, and has submitted majority and minority reports2S which 
may result in action by the 1962 session of the legislature. 
§IOA. JIlegal searches and seizures: Evidence in state criminal 
cases. On June 19, 1961, the Supreme Court of the United States 
resolved, with apparent finality, the controversial issue of the avail-
ability of the fruits of illegal searches and seizures as evidence in 
criminal cases. It decided that, by virtue of the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, such material may not be used at trials 
in state courts.1 
It had been the established law of the federal courts, since 1914,2 
that material seized, at least by federal officers, in violation of the 
search-and-seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment is excludable 
from federal criminal trials. At first, and for many years, the exclu-
sionary rule did not apply to unlawful seizures by non federal per-
sonnel.s In 1949, however, the Supreme Court ruled that unreasonable 
searches and seizures, which if conducted by federal officers would 
violate the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment, are forbidden 
by the Fourteenth Amendment to state officers.4 At this time, however, 
20 This conclusion was reached by the Supreme Judicial Court. Commonwealth 
v. Chamberlain, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1091, 175 N.E.2d 486, was a prosecution against 
the owner of a coin-operated automatic laundry for leaving his premises open to 
public use on Sunday. The Court concluded that the conduct of the defendant 
constituted a violation of the statute, but withheld its decision in order to be guided 
in its ruling on the validity of the statute on the federal constitutional points by 
the result of the appeal in the Crown Kosher Super Market case. 
21 The opinion of the Court contained this caveat. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 
U.S. 420, 453,81 Sup. Ct. llOI, Ill9, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393, 414 (1961). 
22 G.L., c. 136, §33, inserted by Acts of 1960, c. 812, §3, and amended by Acts of 
1961, c. 338, §l. 
23 At the present writing the reports of the committee have not been printed and 
have been made available only in the form of mimeographed press releases. ' 
§10.4. 1 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,8 Sup. Ct. 1684,6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). 
2 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, L.R.A. 
1915B 834 (1914). 
S Ibid. 
4 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,69 Sup. Ct. 1359,93 L. Ed. 1782 (1949). 
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the Court refused to extend to state courts the obligation to exclude 
from evidence the products of unlawful seizures. Later, in 1960, in the 
light of the new doctrine that the Constitution forbids unreasonable 
searches and seizures by state, as well as federal, officers, the exclu-
sionary rule of Weeks was extended so as to apply in federal prosecu-
tions to material illegally seized by state officers and given by them 
"upon a silver platter" to federal prosecutors.5 Thus Mapp, by 
overruling that part of Wolf that refused to extend the exclusionary 
rule to trials in state courts, rounded out the evolution of a doctrine 
that material obtained by search and seizure in violation of the 
Constitution is not proper evidence. 
The doctrine announced by the Supreme Court is completely at 
variance with the rule that had long obtained in Massachusetts6 and 
in a great many other states.7 In many jurisdictions it had been well 
established that evidence, if relevant, was admissible, no matter how 
obtained, even if a violation of a constitutional provision was involved 
in the seizure. 
The rule of the Mapp case, as a statement of the supreme law of the 
land,S is, of course, mandatory in all state criminal prosecutions, but 
the case itself leaves unanswered many procedural questions as to how 
the substantive doctrine is to be applied. 
A litigation in the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts indicates one way in which the constitutional doctrine 
may not be enforced. A newsdealer, contending that certain allegedly 
obscene publications had been unlawfully seized by the local police, 
applied to the federal court for their return to him prior to his trial 
in the state court. In an unreported opinion,9 Caffrey, j., denied 
relief, saying: "A proper respect for federal-state relations requires 
that this complaint be dismissed on the authority of the Stefanelli 
case." lO Subsequently the same plaintiff applied to a district court 
of three judges for an injunction against prosecution in the state court 
and against use as evidence of the seized publications. This relief 
also was denied, the court pointing out that the plaintiff's recourse 
was to litigate through the state courts and, if unsuccessful there, to 
seek review upon the federal question in the Supreme Court of the 
United States.H Although these decisions were handed down before 
5 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 Sup. Ct. 1437, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669 (1960). 
6 Commonwealth v. Wilkins, 243 Mass. 356, 138 N.E. 11 (1923); Commonwealth v. 
Dana, 2 Mete. 329 (Mass. 1841). 
7 A tabulation of state court decisions, prior to the Weeks case, and prior and 
subsequent to the Wolf case, is set forth in an appendix to the majority opinion 
in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224, 80 Sup. Ct. 1437, 1448, 4 L. Ed. 2d 
1669, 1682 (1960). 
S U.S. Const., Art. VI, d. 2. 
9 Interstate Newsdealers Supply, Inc. v. Sullivan, Police Commissioner, C.A. No. 
6O-901-C (D. Mass. 1960). 
10 Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117,72 Sup. Ct. 118,96 L. Ed. 138 (1951). 
11 Jacobs v. Sullivan, 193 F. Supp. 765 (D. Mass. 1961). 
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Mapp was decided, there is no reason to believe that the principle 
of federalism upon which they rest is not still applicable. 
Prior to the decision of the Mapp case the Massachusetts legislature 
provided for the establishment of a special commission to recommend 
laws concerning the use of illegally obtained evidence.12 The com-
mission has been formed, and it will likely present legislative proposals 
for procedure to apply the rule of exclusion. When there is, as in this 
matter, no controlling act of Congress, the implementation of federal 
constitutional doctrine by state courts must be by state procedural 
law.13 
A further problem, one that can be resolved only by judicial deci-
sion, is whether the exclusionary rule has retroactive operation, i.e., 
whether it can be the basis of collateral attack upon convictions in 
decided cases prior to Mapp in which illegally obtained evidence was 
used by the prosecution. When the Supreme Court decided, in 1956, 
that denial of a trial transcript for an indigent defendant's appeal 
could constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws,14 the new 
doctrine was later held to be applicable to set aside the conviction of 
a person whose appeal had been prejudiced by the unavailability 
to him of a trial transcript.15 
§lO.5. Fair trial: Prejudicial publicity. Another chapter in the 
Brink's Robbery Case, which has been noted in these pages before,l was 
written by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 
The case, which grew out of the spectacular robbery involving a loss 
of over $1,200,000 in cash, resulted in conviction of Geagan and seven 
others in the state court. The Supreme Judicial Court, rejecting the 
contention that massive prejudicial pre-indictment and pre-trial pub-
licity emanating fro~ official sources had made it impossible for the 
defendants to obtain a fair trial, affirmed the conviction,2 and the 
Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari.3 A collateral 
attack upon the conviction was made by way of a petition for habeas 
corpus in the United States District Court. That court determined 
that it had jurisdiction, but on the merits it agreed with the Supreme 
Judicial Court that the record of the voir dire examination of jurors 
12 Resolves of 1961, c. 103. 
13 See Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 75 Sup. Ct. 814, 99 L. Ed. 1161 (1955), 
after mandate, Williams v. State, 211 Ga. 763, 88 S.E.2d 376 (1955), cert. denied 
sub nom. Williams v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 950, 76 Sup. Ct. 325, 100 L. Ed. 827 (1956), 
rehearing denied, 350 u.S. 977, 76 Sup. Ct. 429, 100 L. Ed. 847 (1956). 
14 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,76 Sup. Ct. 585, 100 L. Ed. 891 (1956). 
15 Eskridge v. Washington State Prison Board, 357 u.S. 214, 78 Sup. Ct. 1061, 
2 L. Ed. 2d 1269 (1958). 
§1O.5. 1 Commonwealth v. Geagan, 339 Mass. 487, 159 N.E.2d 870 (1959), cert. 
denied sub nom. Geagan v. Massachusetts, 361 U.S. 895, 80 Sup. Ct. 200, 4 L. Ed. 2d 
152 (1959), noted 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §9.1; Geagan v. Gavin, 181 F. Supp. 466 
(D. Mass. 1960), noted 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1O.4. 
2 Commonwealth v. Geagan, 339 Mass. 487, 159 N.E.2d 870 (1959). 
3 Geagan v. Massachusetts, 361 U.S. 895, 80 Sup. Ct. 200, 4 L. Ed. 2d 152 (1959). 
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sufficiently showed that the jurors actually selected for the trial were 
free from prejudice caused by the publicity. Accordingly, the petition 
for habeas corpus was denied.4 
After the appeal was argued, the Supreme Court decided the case of 
Irvin v. Dowd,5 in which it set aside a murder conviction on the ground 
that massive pre-trial publicity, inspired in part by public officials, 
had so inflamed the community, and the adjoining county to which 
the case was removed for trial, that it had apparently been impossible 
to find twelve jurors without any preconception of the defendant's 
guilt. This, the Supreme Court ruled, was incompatible with the 
constitutional requirement of a fair trial. 
The Court of Appeals distinguished Irvin v. Dowd, first, on the score 
that that case, involving as it did particularly revolting multiple 
murders, was calculated to arouse a different kind of public hysteria 
than was the Brink's robbery, which "excited widespread public 
interest and no little general public amazement." 6 Secondly, the two 
cases were unlike in that "no very serious difficulty, as in Irvin v. Dowd, 
was encountered in finding jurors who at least professed not to have 
formed an opinion of guilt." 7 Accordingly, the denial of the petition 
for habeas corpus was affirmed.8 
The convicts have applied for a writ of certiorari,9 but, after four 
months of the October, 1961, Term, the Supreme Court has not acted 
upon the petition. It may be that the Court is holding the case 
pending decision of another case involving what may be comparable 
issues. Beck v. Washington lO raises questions as to whether the 
indictment and trial of a union official for misuse of union funds were 
vitiated by massive adverse publicity. The case was argued November 
14,1961. 
The Supreme Court, by its decision in Irvin v. Dowd and its 
acceptance of jurisdiction in Beck v. Washington, has indicated concern 
over the impact of free and loose discussion of defendants and cases 
upon the administration of criminal justice. In the process of accom-
modating the public interest in punishing the guilty to the equally 
important interest in having fair and impartial trials, the Court is 
faced with the necessity of drawing extremely fine lines of distinction. 
The task of drawing the lines is not simplified by the pleadings in the 
Geagan case. As has been pointed out in the reported opinions 
in the case, the defendants did not make the conventional motions for 
change of venue or for continuance. Their apparent theory was that 
the adverse publicity would have been.,quaIlY prejudicial in any 
4 Geagan v. Gavin, 181 F. Supp. 466 (D. Mass. i~~. 
IS 366 U.S. 7I 7, 81 Sup. Ct. 1639,6 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1961)!" 
6 292 F.2d 244, 247 (1st Cir. 1961). 
7 Ibid. 
8292 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1961). 
9 Geagan v. Gavin, No. 394, October Tenn, 1961. 
10 No. 40, October Term, 1961. Reported below as State v. Beck, 56 Wash. 2d 
474, 349 P.2d 387,353 P.2d 429 (1960), cert. granted, 365 U.S. 866, 81 Sup. Ct. 907, 
5 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1961). 
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county to which the trial might be transferred, and they did not want, 
by asking for a continuance, to waive their statutoryll right to be 
discharged on their own recognizances unless placed on trial within 
six months after their arrest. Instead, they moved for dismissal of the 
indictments against them, on the ground that it would be impossible 
for them to have a trial at once speedy and fair. 
In other cases in which community feelings against the accused 
have vitiated trials for want of fairness, the prosecution has had the 
alternative of postponing the trial until a more neutral atmosphere 
has been established in the 10cality.12 In the Geagan case, however, 
such an alternative did not exist in any real sense. The trial could 
have been postponed, but only upon condition of release of the 
accused from custody, so that there would have been no assurance 
of their availability for trial at any future date. 
§lO.6. General. Certain other decisions handed down during the 
1961 SURVEY year should be noted at this point, although they do not 
seem to call for extended discussion. 
The constitution of Massachusetts, unlike that of the United States,l 
does not contain an express prohibition of multiple jeopardy for the 
same crime. That type of constitutional provision, however, has been 
said to be declaratory of a basic principle of the common law,2 and 
conversely it may be said that judicial application of the principle 
is on the level of constitutional adjudication. In Massachusetts, the 
principle is implemented, in part, by legislation.3 
The principle and the statute came up for construction and applica-
tion in Commonwealth v. Burke.4 There the accused had been tried 
under an indictment charging murder in the second degree. The jury 
returned a verdict of not guilty of murder in the second degree, but 
guilty of manslaughter. Sentence was imposed on the manslaughter 
verdict, but on appeal the judgment was reversed on account of errors 
at the trial. li At a new trial on the original indictment, the accused 
filed a plea in bar to so much of the indictment as charged murder. 
On report of the question by the trial judge,6 the Supreme Judicial 
Court held that the plea in bar should be sustained, since the appeal 
from the manslaughter conviction waived only immunity from a 
second trial for manslaughter, and the verdict of not guilty of murder 
11 C.L., c. 277, §72. 
12 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 Sup. Ct. 1639, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1961); Delaney v. 
United States, 199 F.2d 107, 39 A.L.R.2d 1300 (1st Cir. 1952). 
§10.6. 1 U.S. Const., Amend. V: " ... nor shall any person be subject for the 
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." 
2 Commonwealth v. Roby, 12 Pick. 496 (Mass. 1832). 
3 C.L., c. 263, §7: "A person shall not be held to answer on a second indictment 
or complaint for a crime of which he has been acquitted upon the facts and merits; 
but he may plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent prosecution for the same 
crime .... " 
4 342 Mass. 144, 172 N.E.2d 605 (1961). 
/I Commonwealth v. Burke, 339 Mass. 521, 159 N.E.2d 856, 77 A.L.R.2d 451 (1959). 
6 C.L., c. 278, §30A. 
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was as effective to bar a second prosecution for murder as it would 
have been if returned on an indictment charging murder and man-
slaughter in separate counts. 
Twice the Supreme Judicial Court dealt with issues of federalism. 
Courtney v. Charles Dowd Box CO.7 was a suit by a union to enforce a 
collective bargaining agreement against an employer whose labor 
relations were apparently assumed to be subject to the provisions of 
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.8 It was contended 
that, since Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act9 gives federal 
district courts jurisdiction of suits for violation of collective bargain-
ing agreements, state courts are ousted of jurisdiction to decide such 
cases. The Court held that state and federal courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction of such cases, saying: "In the absence of a clear holding 
by the Supreme Court of the United States that Federal jurisdiction 
has been made exclusive, we shall not make what would be tantamount 
to an abdication of the hitherto undoubted jurisdiction of our own 
courts." 10 The defendant applied for a writ of certiorari, which was 
granted,H but the case was not reached for argument at the October, 
1960, Term of the Supreme Court. It has been carried over as Case 
No. 33 in the October, 1961, Term.12 
In another case,13 an insurance company claimed immunity from 
the excise14 on domestic insurance companies measured by their gross 
premiums for policies written during the tax year, insofar as it took 
into account premiums from policies covering risks in Hong Kong 
and Surinam. The company argued that, in the light of the Supreme 
Court's decision15 that the business of insurance is interstate commerce 
which is subject to the Sherman Act,16 the writing of the Hong Kong 
and Surinam policies was foreign commerce, and as such exempt from 
state taxation. The Supreme Judicial Court rejected this contention, 
pointing out that, whatever the situation might be otherwise, the 
McCarran Act,17 as interpreted by the Supreme Court,18 fully removed 
any negative implications of the commerce clause19 that might be taken 
7341 Mass. 347,169 N.E.2d 885 (1960). 
849 Stat. 449 (1935),61 Stat. 136 (1947),29 U.S.C. §§151 et seq. (1958). 
961 Stat. at 156,29 U.S.C. §185 (1958). 
10341 Mass. 337, 338-339,169 N.E.2d 885, 887 (1960). 
11 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 365 U.S. 809 (1961). 
12 On February 19, 1961, the Supreme Court made it unnecessary for the state 
court to submit to involuntary "abdication" of its jurisdiction. The decision noted 
was affirmed. 368 U.S. 502, 82 Sup. Ct. 519, 7 L. Ed. 483 (1962). 
13 Springfield Ins. Co. v. State Tax Commission, 342 Mass. 505, 174 N.E.2d 455 
(1961.) 
14 C.L., c. 63, §22. 
15 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533, 64 Sup. Ct. 
1162, 88 L. Ed. 1440 (1944). 
16 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§I et seq. (1958). 
1759 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§101l-1015 (1958). 
18 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 66 Sup. Ct. 1142, 90 L. Ed. 1342 
(1946). 
19 U.S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3. 
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to bar taxation by a state of insurance companies doing business within 
its borders. The company also contended that the tax was repugnant 
to the import-export clause of the federal Constitution,2o but the Court 
pointed out that the tax was not on the policies (if, indeed, the policies 
were properly called exports) but on the franchise of the company. 
The company also challenged the tax as wanting in due process of law. 
The contention was that the gross premiums from the foreign policies 
were not delivered to the company in Massachusetts, but were paid to 
and retained by its foreign representative abroad. Only net balances, 
after deducting amounts necessary to pay claims and expenses, were 
remitted to the local company. Hence, it was argued, the gross 
premiums for the foreign risks were beyond the geographical jurisdic-
tion, and thus outside the tax jurisdiction, of Massachusetts. Again, 
however, the Court pointed out that the tax is an excise upon the 
franchise of a domestic corporation, the valuation of which is a matter 
traditionally committed to the broad discretion of the state. On 
the record before it, the Court was unwilling to conclude that the use 
of gross premiums as a measure of the value of the franchise was other 
than a "fair approximation" 21 of the value of an admittedly taxable 
subject. 
In another case,22 the Court rejected a contention that would have 
put common law doctrine beyond the power of the legislature to 
change. It is settled common law that an out-of-state administrator of 
a foreign decedent is not amenable to the process of local courts, be-
cause his rights and liabilities cannot extend beyond the jurisdiction 
of the sovereign which appointed him.23 In 1952 24 the Massachusetts 
legislature amended the statute25 which provides that nonresident 
motorists, by using the highways of the state, constitute the registrar 
of motor vehicles an attorney upon whom may be served process in an 
action growing out of an accident in which the motorist has been in-
volved while operating a vehicle on such highway. The amendment 
provided that the registrar should also be authorized to accept service 
of process in actions against the executors or administrators of non-
resident motorists. The present case grew out of an accident that 
occurred while a Connecticut motorist was driving a Massachusetts 
resident along a Massachusetts highway. Neither the driver nor the 
passenger survived the accident. The latter's administratrix brought 
a wrongful death action against the person who had been appointed 
administrator of the driver's estate by a Connecticut court. There was 
no ancillary administration of the driver's estate in Massachusetts. 
The Supreme Judicial Court found no want of due process in the 
20 Id. §10, d. 2: "No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any 
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports . . ." 
21 342 Mass. 505, 513, 174 N.E.2d 455, 460 (1961). 
22 Toczko v. Armentano, 341 Mass. 485, 170 N .E.2d 472 (1960). 
23 Beaman v. Elliot, 10 Cush. 172 (Mass. 1852). 
24 Acts of 1952, c. 125. 
25 G.L., c. 90, §3A. 
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statute which subjected the foreign administrator to the jurisdiction 
of Massachusetts courts. It pointed out that the same considerations 
which sustained the right of Massachusetts to make effective service 
of process upon the transient motorist himself 26 were persuasive of the 
right of Massachusetts to reach his personal representative in case he 
does not survive to be sued in propria persona. 
28 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 u.S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927). 
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